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This paper formulates a simple model of female labor force decisions which embeds an
in-work benet reform and explicitly allows for announcement and implementation eects.
We explore several mechanisms through which women can respond to the announcement
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ts, including sources of intertemporal substitution,
human capital accumulation, and labor market frictions. Using the model's insights and
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in-work benet reform, we estimate its eects on single mothers' behavior. We nd large
and positive announcement eects on employment decisions. We show that this 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ects produce implementation eect estimates that are
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Expectations are central to human life and economic analysis. Economists have long
developed models in which individuals and rms are postulated to be forward looking
and to respond to changes in the environment in which they make their decisions even
before such changes actually occur. But while there has been extensive work documenting
how economic agents adjust their behavior in anticipation of a variety of alterations to
their environment, there has been relatively little research on anticipatory responses by
individuals to welfare reforms. The common approach in the empirical evaluation literature
instead has been to assume either that the implementation of a reform comes as a complete
surprise, or that there is little or no scope or incentive for agents to respond to information
or beliefs about a possible reform in advance of its implementation. The goal of this
paper is to analyze the potential nature of such anticipatory responses, in the context of a
change in working tax credits. Under what conditions and how would women adjust their
labor supply behavior in anticipation of, and in response to, announcements about welfare
reform? How would anticipation and announcement eects inuence the evaluation of the
impacts of welfare reform?
To help answer these questions, we formulate a simple model of female labor force par-
ticipation decisions which embeds a basic in-work benet reform and explicitly allows for
announcement and anticipation eects. We describe several mechanisms through which
women's work behavior can respond to the announcement of an in-work benet reform
that permanently increases their earnings provided that they work. On the one hand,
intertemporal substitution eects through preferences and saving would lead to a labor
supply reduction between the announcement and the implementation of the reform. For
example, an increasing disutility of working would cause forward-looking women who an-
ticipate the introduction of the reform to prefer a withdrawal from the labor market today
and a later entry into the market when they can reap the monetary benets oered by
the reform. On the other hand, labor market frictions, human capital formation and habit
persistence could lead women to increase their labor supply in response to the announce-
ment of a future increase in earnings tax credits. For instance, in the presence of labor
market frictions where job availability is not guaranteed, women have an incentive to enter
or remain in the labor market after the announcement, so that they are in a position to
collect the in-work benet when the reform is implemented.
We next apply this analysis to examine whether and how a specic targeted group of
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individuals (single mothers) may have changed their labor market choices in anticipation of
the introduction of a major tax reform in the UK. More specically, we study the eects of
the announcement and the implementation of the Working Families' Tax Credit (WFTC)
reform on single mothers' employment. The WFTC reform was initially presented in the
UK Parliament in November 1997, ocially announced in the Budget speech in March
1998, and nally implemented eighteen months later, in October 1999, oering ample
room for anticipatory behavior. In addition to a large implementation eect, we nd
evidence of a signicant positive announcement eect on labor supply, measured between
the time WFTC was announced and its actual implementation. We are able to document
the timing of the announcement quite precisely according to the Budget speech and media
coverage. Both the announcement eect and the implementation eect emerge for several
labor market outcomes, and are especially strong for mothers of children of preschool and
primary school age for whom the tax credit increase was in fact particularly large. We
interpret the large anticipatory employment increase as a response to signicant labor
market frictions.
We also nd strong announcement eects along the informal (unpaid) child care utiliza-
tion margin, and not along the paid child care margin, for which instead we nd sizeable
implementation eects. These latter eects can be explained by the fact that, at the time of
the WFTC reform, formal child care services were relatively expensive and the pre-WFTC
in-work support was not particularly generous towards child care expenditures. Therefore,
single mothers who wanted to take advantage of the benets oered by the WFTC reform
decided to enter the labor market as soon as they could and found temporary child care
arrangements for their children before placing them in formal daycare centers (or other
formal child care arrangements) after gaining eligibility to WFTC's substantial child care
tax credit top-up.
The paper continues with a brief discussion of the relevant literature on anticipatory
economic behavior, with a focus on tax and welfare reforms. In Section II a labor supply
model is formulated and simulated, and its key econometric implications for public policy
program evaluation are discussed. Section III describes the Working Families' Tax Credit
reform, the data used in estimation as well as the identication strategy for recovering
the announcement and implementation eect parameters. Section IV presents the main
empirical results on labor market outcomes and provides an economic interpretation based
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on the model of Section II. Section V shows the reform's impact on child care utilization,
examines transitions along labor market and child care use margins, and discusses a number
of sensitivity tests. Section VI concludes with a discussion of broader implications for the
evaluation of policy reforms and highlights the need for collecting new data on agents'
knowledge and subjective expectations regarding the likelihood and nature of future social
interventions.
I. Related Literature
The connection between news announcements or expectations of future events and individ-
ual responses by forward looking agents has a long history in economics. Recent examples
include a wide range of economic behaviors, from the role of news and expectations as
drivers of business cycles and stock prices (Beaudry and Portier, 2006; Jaimovich and
Rebelo, 2009) to the response of foreign exchange rate quotations to macroeconomic an-
nouncements (Andersen et al., 2003; Evans and Lyons, 2008). Mertens and Ravn (2010)
provide empirical evidence on the aggregate eects of anticipated and unanticipated U.S.
tax policy shocks. They nd that both types of shocks have contributed to the busi-
ness cycle, and associate anticipated tax cuts with signicant pre-implementation changes
in output, investment, and hours worked. Examples of tax reform studies at the micro
level include evaluations of the impact of announced changes in corporate income taxes on
rms' dividend and investment policies (Kari, Karikallio, and Pirttila, 2008) and the eect
of tax rebate announcements on consumer spending (Heim, 2007).1 Relatively few studies
have investigated anticipation and announcement eects associated with welfare and tax
credit reforms. As a consequence, little is known about whether and how forward-looking
individuals alter their labor supply behavior in anticipation of new policies.
Clearly, to understand observed changes in outcomes following a reform, it is important
to know the extent to which the reform was expected. When comparing outcomes just
before and after implementation of a policy change, a lack of a behavioral response does
1Other examples of anticipatory behaviors in response to tax and benet changes include Auerbach
and Siegel (2000), who provide evidence of shifting of taxable income by rms and high income individuals
to future periods in anticipation of the 1986 Tax Act (which reduced corporate and individual tax rates).
Goolsbee (2000) also documents an increased exercise of stock options by high income executives in
anticipation of an increase in marginal income tax rates, while Pencavel (2001) emphasizes the importance
of expectations about future reforms for understanding the impacts of a series of `one-time' early retirement
schemes oered to faculty at the University of California.
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not necessarily imply that the change was ineective, as the policy change may have been
fully anticipated. Mott (1987) attributes the absence of a jump in labor supply following
social security reforms to the fact that they were fully anticipated.
Others have pointed to the role of expectations in explaining the increase in the exit rate
out of unemployment in anticipation of unemployment benet exhaustion (e.g., Mott,
1985; Meyer, 1990; Card and Hyslop, 2005), and in response to a shorter benet duration
(Card, Chetty, and Weber, 2007), while Grogger and Michalopoulos (2003) nd signicant
eects of time limits on welfare receipt on welfare participation. Attanasio and Rohwedder
(2003) nd some anticipatory impact of social security announcements on consumption
behavior of workers.2
Limited discussions of announcement and anticipation eects can be found in few other
studies. For instance, Black et al. (2003) examine the impact on the exit rate out of
unemployment of a threat of mandatory training and re-employment services required
for continued unemployment benet receipt. The threat in their context could be seen
as a news announcement in our context, changing the information set of unemployment
insurance claimants. They nd substantial reductions in both duration and level of benets
received and a large increase in subsequent earnings. The earnings gain appears to result
primarily from earlier return to work of individuals in the treatment group soon after
receiving notice of the mandatory training and re-employment services. This result is
consistent with the presence of strong announcement eects, whereby job-ready claimants
respond to the threat of the program and exit unemployment quickly.3
Despite having witnessed a massive introduction of welfare and tax reforms around the
world during the past twenty years, it remains common practice in evaluating reform im-
pacts to assume away anticipatory behavioral responses. Each new reform is treated as if
entirely unanticipated (anticipated with zero probability), which, if untrue, may generate
2A study by the Council of Economic Advisers (1997) examined the eect of waiver activity in the
early 1990s on welfare caseload, and found that waivers made a substantial contribution to the reduction
in caseload. Thus, knowledge that welfare policies were to become stricter deterred women from welfare
participation even before waivers were implemented. See also Mott (1999).
3In their evaluation of Progresa | a major social program in Mexico that provided generous conditional
cash transfers to parents of children who attended school and lived in treatment villages | Attanasio,
Meghir, and Santiago (forthcoming), instead, nd no evidence of anticipation eects on villages not initially
selected for program eligibility. Two mechanisms have been proposed to explain this result. First, although
the program was scheduled to be later extended to control villages, parents in the control group might
have been unable to take advantage of this knowledge because they were liquidity constrained. Second,
families in control villages may in fact have been unaware or uncertain of future eligibility to the program,
as there was no explicit, public announcement about the future availability of the grants.
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biased impact estimates. In part, this practice may reect the complications induced by
anticipation eects for econometric analysis. Recent work on dynamic treatment eect
models highlights the importance of a no-anticipation assumption for identifying treat-
ment eects (Abbring and van den Berg, 2003). The research summarized in Abbring
and Heckman (2007) explicitly discusses sequential randomization and no-anticipation as-
sumptions, requiring potential outcomes to be unaected by agent actions in response to
dierent predictions of future treatments and outcomes (see also Heckman and Vytlacil,
2007).
An important implication of this work for reduced-form or treatment eects approaches
is that valid inference requires an ability to condition on agent information sets, including
the perceived likelihood of, and eligibility to, future policy reforms. With forward-looking
behavior, the assumed pre-reform comparability of treatment and control groups underly-
ing many widely used evaluation procedures requires both groups to have common expec-
tations about future policy changes as well as comparable abilities and motivations to act
upon such knowledge. In specifying potential outcomes, then, one should not only consider
the eects of actual program participation, but also the eects of the information available
to agents about the program and policy. Crepon et al. (2010) reject the no-anticipation
assumption in their study of French training programs for the unemployed and show that,
with data on the date of information notication, the causal eects of notication and of
the treatment on the outcome are identied.
An attractive feature of models with forward looking behavior is that they require
an explicit specication of agents' information sets, including individual beliefs about the
likelihood of a future policy reform. For example, Heckman and Navarro (2007) formulate
an optimal stopping model in which individuals sequentially decide the age at which to
stop schooling and can learn about measured and unmeasured variables that aect expec-
tations of future outcomes. Their model is suitable for the analysis of outcomes associated
with dierent times to treatment (including both anticipatory and implementation eects)
without imposing the no-anticipation condition invoked by Abbring and van den Berg
(2003).
Another example that incorporates expectations of a future reform is the study by van
der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008). They estimate the impact of social security reforms on
savings and labor supply decisions, and to help identify the perceived risk of a reform they
5
use self-reported subjective expectations data on future social security benets individuals
expect to receive.4 Similarly, Keane and Wolpin (2002) develop a model in which indi-
viduals form expectations about future welfare program changes and specify a stochastic
process for variation in benet rule parameters. Simulation results indicate that the eect
of changes in welfare benets on behavior depends critically on how individuals form ex-
pectations about future welfare benets and whether these are perceived to be permanent
or transitory.
Despite these important advances, it should be pointed out that while allowing for
uncertainty about the occurrence and timing of future policy implementations, none of the
current structural models fully embeds the notion of policy change announcements. This
is important because news announcements may directly aect agent expectations and
information sets and thus lead to anticipatory behaviors. As the model in the next section
illustrates, the interplay and timing of policy announcements, individuals' expectations,
and the actual implementation of a reform are all key elements which jointly determine
the eventual total impact of any reform.
II. A Model of Female Labor Supply with Welfare Reform and
Pre-Implementation Eects
A. Setup
We illustrate our key insights regarding the role and implications of pre-implementation
anticipation and announcement eects for welfare policy evaluation research using a simple
model of female labor supply.
Consider a three-period economy in which each woman i chooses in each period t
whether to work (yit = 1) or not (yit = 0) and how much to consume (cit).
5 In each period
t = 1; 2; 3, a woman's objective is to maximize the expected present value of her remaining
lifetime utility
E
"
3X
s=t
s t Uis(cis; yis; Xis 1)j
is
#
; (1)
4See also Dominitz, Manski, and Heinz (2003) for evidence showing strong consumer expectations of a
future decline in the generosity of the social security benet program.
5Although the model could be easily extended to more periods, this extension would not add further
insights, while the model's salient features can be fully shown in this three-period formulation.
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with respect to yit and cit. In (1), Xit 1 denotes the number of periods the woman has
worked prior to period t (and, without loss of generality, Xi0 is set equal to zero),  is
the subjective discount factor, E[] is the mathematical expectation operator, and 
it is
the individual's information set at time t. The latter includes information the woman has
regarding the possible implementation of a future policy reform, which we discuss in detail
below. The law of motion for work experience, Xit is given by
Xit = Xit 1 + yit; (2)
and end-of-period assets, Ait, evolve according to
Ait = (1 + r)Ait 1 + wityit +Nit   cit; (3)
where r is the real interest rate, wit represents woman i's potential earnings, and Nit is
her exogenous nonlabor income. Choices are subject to a nonnegativity constraint on net
assets requiring Ais  0, s = 1; 2; 3; and a lifetime resource constraint
3X
t=1

1
1 + r
t
cit =
3X
t=1

1
1 + r
t
(wityit +Nit); (4)
for which we assume A0 = A4 = 0.
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Potential earnings are stochastic and depend on previous work experience. In particu-
lar,
log(wit) = w0 + Xit 1 + dtI(t  2)yit + it; (5)
where the parameter  measures the returns to work experience, I(z) is an indicator func-
tion that is equal to one if z occurs and zero otherwise, and it is a technology shock
which captures random uctuations in earnings that are independent of the individual
decision process. We assume that it has an identical and independent over time logistic
distribution.
The term dt is an indicator of the implementation of a one-time welfare reform that
could occur either in period 2 or 3. That is, in periods 2 and 3, dt = 1 if the reform is or
already has been implemented and dt = 0 if the reform has not been implemented. Based
on acquired information 
it, individuals form beliefs about the likelihood that the reform
6In the analysis below, we will also consider a model without saving, where the period-by-period budget
constraint equals cit=wityit+Nit.
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will be introduced in future periods. We denote the beliefs in period 1 about a reform in
period 2 by 12 = Pr(d2 = 1j
1). Beliefs in period t = 1; 2 about a reform in period 3 are
denoted by t3(d2) = Pr(d3 = 1j
t; d2), where t3(1) = 1.
The parameter  in (5) encapsulates the benet of the reform. The reform gives each
woman a permanent shift in log-earnings, , provided that the woman works (yit = 1).
For simplicity, the log-earnings shift is independent of prior work experience and does not
depend on a minimum number of weekly hours worked. Both such features could be added
to the model, but they would not change its main insights.
Per period utility derived from consumption and work eort is specied as follows:
Uit = (1 + 3yit)log(cit) + (1 + 2Xit 1)yit: (6)
In (6), Uit is decreasing in yit (i.e., 1 < 0) reecting disutility of work, and increasing in
consumption, cit. Letting the labor market decisions interact with prior experience implies
that the utility function is not intertemporally separable, as long as 2 6= 0: a positive
value of 2 may be interpreted as habit formation in the labor market, whereas a negative
value would capture an increasing current disutility of work with previous work eort or
increasing propensity to substitute nonmarket time in subsequent periods. Finally, the
value of good consumption may be increased (3 > 0) or decreased (3 < 0) when the
woman participates in the labor market.
Finally, women take decisions in a labor market environment that may include frictions.
Labor market imperfections are reected in the choice set available. Specically, yit 2 Jit,
where Jit denotes the work choice set available to woman i in period t, and this is equal to
f0g (that is, no job is available) with probability (1  t) and to f0; 1g (that is, the choice
set includes both `not working' and `working') with probability t. We assume that there
is no current labor market friction for a woman who worked in the previous period, that
is, t(yit 1) = 1 if yit 1 = 1, while the job arrival rate if currently not working t(0) may
be less than one.
B. Simulations
As an illustration of the possible eects of welfare reform on labor supply, we solve the
model and use its solution to simulate choice decisions of women under a number of dierent
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model specications.7 In the benchmark case, the following parameter values are used:
 = 0:95; r = 0:05; Nit = 0:5; w0 = 0:2,  = 0,  = 0:45, 1 =  1:4; 2 = 3 = 0 and
t(0) = 1. In this model, therefore, there are no job search frictions (t(0) = 1), utility
is time separable (2 = 0), and there is no return to human capital ( = 0). Moreover,
in this benchmark model we assume no saving, with individuals in each period facing the
period-by-period budget constraint cit = wityit +Nit.
We then analyze a set of alternative model specications, changing one feature of the
benchmark case separately each time. First, to capture the role of labor market frictions,
we consider a case where the job oer arrival rate when previously unemployed is less than
unity, t(0) = 0:5. Second, we analyze a model with human capital accumulation, with
wages depending on work experience ( = 0:25). Third, we assess the role of non-time-
separable preferences by looking at a case of habit persistence, where 2 = 0:25. Fourth,
we consider the role of intertemporal substitution with disutility of working increasing in
past work experience (2 = 1:5). Fifth, we consider a version of the benchmark model
that allows for saving behavior, whereby women face the lifetime resource constraint given
by (4).
For each of these alternative model specications, we then assess the impact of several
reform scenarios. To ease interpretation, all impacts on employment choices will be shown
relative to a baseline scenario in which there is no reform and in which the possibility of a
reform is never envisaged by women. Instead, in all but one reform scenarios we consider,
a reform is actually implemented and/or anticipated or announced. For simplicity, we
will assume in these scenarios that in period 1 women assign an equal probability to the
implementation of a reform in periods 2 and 3, such that 12  Pr(d2 = 1j
1) = 13(0) 
Pr(d3 = 1jd2 = 0;
1) = 1. Beliefs in period 2 about the likelihood of a reform in the last
period are denoted by 23(0) = Pr(d3 = 1jd2 = 0;
2) = 2.
As in the baseline scenario, in reform scenario (i), we assume 1 = 2 = 0. Thus,
no reform is anticipated or announced, but unlike the baseline, the reform is actually
implemented in period 3 (d3 = 1). This is the case of an unannounced and unanticipated
reform, the sort of ideal scenario analysts have in mind in reform evaluations. In scenario
(ii), individuals again rule out the possibility of a future reform in period 1, i.e., 1 = 0.
But an announcement in period 2 that the reform will be introduced in period 3 changes
7The model solution is presented in Appendix A.
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women's beliefs entirely, implying 2 = 1. This is, therefore, a case where an unanticipated
announcement in period 2 will be part of the individual's information set at t = 2. In
scenario (iii), in which we assume 1 = 0:5 and 2 = 1, women in period 1 assign a 50
percent chance that the reform will be introduced in period 2 as well as a 50 percent
chance that the reform will be implemented in period 3 if it was not already implemented
in period 2; while the implementation of the reform in period 3 is announced in period 2
(hence, the updated belief 2 is greater than the prior 1). Finally, in scenario (iv), we
have an announcement | as in scenario (ii) | of a completely unanticipated next-period
reform in period 2, but in period 3 the reform fails to materialize.
Starting with the simulations for the benchmark model with no search frictions, time-
separable utility, no saving and no human capital accumulation, Figure 1 shows that the
only predicted employment change occurs in period 3 and coincides with the implemen-
tation of the reform in that period. Pre-reform information is immaterial: neither an-
ticipation nor announcement of the reform aects employment choices in earlier periods,
indicating that there is no incentive to change behavior in the benchmark model. In this
environment, individuals act the same as if they were myopic.
In the case with search frictions, Figure 2 shows that while we again see large employ-
ment increases in the third period coinciding with the implementation of the reform, there
are now also increased gains from working in the rst two periods as doing so guarantees
the option to work in a subsequent period. Both the anticipation of a possible future reform
in period 1 as well as an announcement in period 2 lead to increases in the employment
rate in pre-implementation periods. These increases in turn contribute to a greater overall
employment increase in period 3 (relative to scenario (i)) when the reform is implemented.
In case of scenario (iv), this pre-implementation knowledge actually leads to a (small) em-
ployment increase in period 3 even though no actual reform materializes. As the gures
make clear, in the presence of anticipation eects, both the eventual implementation of
the reform and its absence can aect behavior.8
The presence of human capital eects (Figure 3) generates qualitatively very similar
changes in employment. The anticipation or announcement of a future reform causes
8In an environment in which policy makers engage in repeated interactions with economic agents, it
is important to assess the credibility of reform announcements that are systematically unfullled. The
development of the political economy considerations associated with this issue, however, is beyond the
scope of our paper. For a related discussion on modeling the political economy of policy choice, see Besley
and Case (2000)).
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individuals to increase their participation in the labor market prior to the actual reform
because the latter increases the expected future wage return to work experience. These
gains are especially large in the rst period, as reected in the large employment increase
in that period for scenario (iii). Moreover, pre-reform increases in employment actually
contribute to a larger overall employment increase (compared to the unanticipated reform
in scenario (i)) in the implementation period 3.
In Figures 4 and 5 we explore two kinds of time non-separable preferences: one in which
the disutility of working declines with work experience, a form of habit persistence, and
one in which the disutility of working instead increases with work experience. As shown
in Figure 4, in the presence of habit persistence, agents who anticipate or learn about the
future implementation of a reform that increases net wages start working more in earlier
periods, as doing so will increase the utility received from working once the reform has
been implemented. As was the case for the model with human capital accumulation, the
gains from, and the resulting increase in, employment in period 1 are especially large.
While Figures 2{4 exhibit anticipatory behavior leading to increases in pre-reform em-
ployment, Figures 5 and 6 instead feature responses from models that generate pre-reform
employment reductions. The case of intertemporal substitution due to non-separability
of preferences where the disutility of working increases with work experience is shown in
Figure 5. In period 2, the announcement of an unanticipated reform to be implemented
in period 3 now causes the employment rate in period 2 to fall, in anticipation of the
higher earnings and employment rate in period 3. Similarly, the anticipation in period 1
of a possible future reform leads to a lower employment rate in that period. As was the
case for the previous model specications, pre-reform employment responses contribute
to an overall larger employment increase (relative to the unanticipated reform of scenario
(i)) in period 3. In case of scenario (iv), pre-reform knowledge still generates a (small)
employment increase in period 3 even though the reform is not actually implemented.
Finally, Figure 6 considers the same no-search-frictions, time-separable utility and no-
human-capital-accumulation model associated with Figure 1, while now allowing for saving
behavior (but no borrowing). Saving generates employment responses in the various reform
scenarios that are qualitatively very similar to those shown in Figure 5. Intertemporal sub-
stitution of leisure again causes agents to reduce their pre-reform employment in response
to an anticipated future increase in labor supply in period 3 (when their wages are higher).
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This anticipatory behavior is further associated with a greater eventual employment in-
crease in the period the reform is implemented.
C. Econometric Implications and Identication Issues
As illustrated in Figures 1{6, when a reform is announced or when there is some antici-
pation of its possible implementation, individual behavior can be aected even before the
reform's actual introduction. Depending on what exact eects one is interested in evaluat-
ing, these behavioral responses would generally be considered part of the program's overall
causal eect. For example, in the case of an announcement of an entirely unanticipated
reform (scenario (ii)), the employment rates in periods 2 and 3 could be compared to those
in the baseline scenario (i.e., the dierences shown in Figures 1{6) to obtain estimates
of the announcement eect and the implementation eect of the pre-announced reform,
which together characterize its overall impact.9
In analyses using dierences-in-dierences (DD) methods, the baseline (counterfactual)
scenario is typically approximated by the experiences of a control group. Thus, employment
rates in the baseline scenario are estimated using the employment rates of a comparison
group, consisting of otherwise similar individuals who are not eligible for, or unaected by,
the reform. In this case, comparing the period 2 versus period 1 dierence in employment
rates for the treatment group with the same dierence for the control group will provide an
estimate of the announcement eect, while the similar comparison for the period 3 versus
period 1 dierences will instead estimate the pre-announced program's implementation
eect. These comparisons will serve as estimates of the dierences shown in Figures 1{6.
Clearly, DD analyses based on pre- and post-implementation comparisons of employment
rates that contrast period 3 with either just period 2, or with periods 1 and 2 combined
will generally lead to inaccurate inferences regarding the reform's overall eect. Forward
looking behavior in a world with, for example, search frictions could then lead to underes-
timation of the reform's impact, while with saving or non-time-separable utility could lead
to overestimation of the true overall causal eect.
Correct evaluation therefore depends crucially on knowledge by the evaluator of the
extent to which individuals may have anticipated or learned about the reform prior to its
9Note that this implementation eect of the pre-announced reform corresponds to the change in the
employment rate in period 3 relative to the baseline scenario in which no reform is actually implemented,
anticipated or announced. It measures the combined eect of the announcement and implementation.
12
implementation. Were there discussions and/or formal announcements of possible reforms
in the periods leading up to their actual implementation? Was there scope and a potential
benet for agents to act on this information? Not only is this important for valid inference,
but it is also key to understanding the overall eect of an intervention.
As illustrated by our simulations, the overall size of the employment eect depends on
whether the reform was announced prior to implementation. That is, the extent to which
individuals can and will act in advance of a subsequent reform can aect its ultimate overall
impact. For example, in the case of labor market frictions, advance knowledge allows more
people to take advantage of the in-work benet, by staying in or entering the labor market
before the reform is implemented. Thus, the eectiveness of a given reform can crucially
depend on the way it is implemented, and especially on when it was proposed, passed, and
implemented.
While in many cases it may be reasonable to assume that a reform was unanticipated
before it was announced or implemented, or at least that 1 was very small, in other
cases this seems less reasonable. For instance, as mentioned earlier, while there may be
uncertainty about the exact timing and specics of a benet reform, many individuals
report in surveys that they anticipate a reform that will reduce their future social security
retirement benets (Dominitz, Manski, and Heinz, 2003). In the presence of anticipation
eects, such as described in scenarios (iii) and (iv), evaluating the impact of an intervention
is more complex. First, one needs to rene the question of what eect one hopes to
estimate. In a world in which a new reform is unexpectedly implemented or unexpectedly
announced, it seems appropriate to dene the counterfactual outcomes to be those that
would have occurred in the same world had the reform or announcement never occurred.
However, in a world in which people anticipate the possibility of a future reform, instead of
considering an environment in which reforms never occur, a more reasonable counterfactual
would be a world in which a reform may occur in the future, but has not been announced
or implemented yet. That is, the counterfactual outcomes are the outcomes that would
have occurred without an announcement in period 2 and without the implementation in
period 3. As it is clear from comparing scenarios (iii) and (iv), the non-occurrence of a
pre-announced reform in such a world can be an event that directly aects behavior itself.
Second, in a world in which individuals consider the possibility of future reforms, the
requirements for a valid control group in DD type evaluations become more stringent. Not
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only do control and treatment group members must have comparable characteristics and
backgrounds, but they also need to have had comparable knowledge, beliefs, and expec-
tations about future reforms and about future decision environments more generally. In
scenarios (iii) and (iv), then, the valid counterfactual for estimating the announcement ef-
fect is a world where people had similar expectations but no announcement of a reform was
made. For estimating the overall eect of the announcement and subsequent implementa-
tion, the counterfactual is a world in which neither occurred. For the observed outcomes
in periods 1 and 2 of control group members to be suitable proxies for what outcomes
would have been without the announcement and/or implementation of the reform, the
corresponding control group should have had comparable characteristics and expectations,
but were not eligible and/or subjected to the reform or its announcement.10
III. Application: The WFTC Reform
A. Overview of the Reform and Its Announcement
Our application investigates the introduction of theWorking Families' Tax Credit (WFTC),
a major in-work benet reform introduced in Britain in October 1999. We focus on its
impact on single mothers, a primary target group of the reform.11 Our goal is to use
the insights from the model of the previous section to guide our interpretation of single
mothers' labor market and child care utilization decisions in anticipation of, and response
to, the introduction of the WFTC reform.
A number of previous studies have already provided comprehensive descriptions of this
reform and its impact on a wide set of outcomes (see, among others, Blundell and Hoynes,
2004; Francesconi and van der Klaauw, 2007; Brewer et al., 2009). Appendix B describes
the details of the policy change. In what follows, we stress three special features, namely,
the economic climate within which WFTC was introduced, its formal announcement with
the long time gap leading to implementation, and the economic salience of the reform.
Economic Context | The WFTC reform was introduced on October 5th, 1999. By that
year, the UK economy had recovered from the recession of the early 1990s, with the
10Note that this also requires an absence of general equilibrium and spillover eects.
11While some working married couples with children also benetted from theWFTC reform, Francesconi,
Rainer and van der Klaauw (2009) show that the tax credit and its corresponding labor supply eects
were more modest for this sub-population.
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unemployment rate reaching 5 percent (about half of what it was in 1992), and GDP
growth being stable at around 3 percent (as opposed to the negative growth experienced
in 1991 and 1992). At the same time, the balance of payments was in good standing, and
positive in 1997 and 1998, and ination was low (less than 2 percent), with the base rate of
interest being independently set by the Bank of England since 1997. Public nances were
also healthy, following a period of continued decline in government net borrowing which
moved into surplus in 1998/99. The pound was strong and consumer condence high. The
growth rate in household consumption expenditures more than doubled between 1995 and
1998, from less than 2 percent to over 5 percent. Part of this increased condence could
be seen in the housing market, which in 1997 experienced the rst signicant positive
growth in house prices since 1989. When the WFTC reform was implemented in October
1999, therefore, the British economy was in a strong position, with a positive outlook for
a balanced and stable growth.
Announcement and Media Coverage | Prior to the reform in October 1999, another work-
conditioned transfer called Family Credit (FC) had been in operation since April 1988.
The Pre-Budget Statement in November 1997 of the newly elected Labour government
(the Labour Party won the elections in May of that same year) announced an in-work
benet reform as a crucial instrument of the government's strategy to `make work pay'
for low-income families. The Budget on the 18th of March 1998 formally announced the
new tax credit and set out the time of its ocial introduction (approximately 18 months
later), which did not have to be further approved by other Parliamentary commissions or
governmental bodies.
WFTC dominated the Budget speech in the Commons and, together with the New
Deals for the unemployed, it represented a prominent feature of the new welfare-to-work
architecture. Other benets supporting families with young children, which were also
scheduled to change, such as Income Support | the primary cash transfer to low-income
nonworking individuals (in many respects similar to TANF in the US) | and Child Benet,
were barely mentioned.
Importantly, the March 1998 announcement was truthful. Table 1 shows how the key
parameters of the tax credit actually changed between the baseline FC year (i.e., 1998) and
the new WFTC regime (1999) and how they diered from the time they were announced
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in the 1998 Budget speech and the time WFTC was implemented in October 1999. Of the
eight parameters listed in the table, six exhibit either no or a negligible nominal dierence
between implementation and announcement. The dierences virtually disappear if the
announced values are corrected to account for ination (see the values in square brackets
in column (4)). For the two parameters with a more sizeable variation (i.e., the basic rate
and the credit for children aged 0{10), the gaps between implementation and announcement
cannot be attributed to ination adjustments only, with the actual values being slightly
larger (more generous) than those announced 18 months earlier.
The 1998 Budget received phenomenal media coverage. The government's dissemina-
tion eort was intense, as revealed by the considerable number of press releases issued
by the Treasury on March 17th, 1998 (the day of the speech) and by the emphasis of
post-Budget press releases issued by the Department of Social Security, which was then
responsible for the administration of Family Credit.12 A content analysis of four major
tabloid newspapers (The Sun, The Daily Mirror, The Daily Express, and The Daily Star),
two main broadsheet papers (The Times and The Daily Telegraph) and the BBC's Online
News Service shows at least 250 stories on the announcement of the new tax credit reform
published during the course of 1998. Almost three-quarters of these came out between
February and April 1998. According to data from the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS), approximately 52 percent of single mothers read a newspaper regularly and, after
controlling for a standard set of socio-demographic variables, single mothers' likelihood of
reading a daily newspaper was not statistically dierent from all other women's (including
single childless women).13 This evidence provides only an indication that single mothers
received payo-relevant information around the time of the announcement of the reform,
much before its introduction. Clearly, they could have relied not just on newspapers but
also on television and radio as well as on social interactions with relatives, friends and
neighbors, for which reliable data are not available.
Salience | Like its predecessor, eligibility to the WFTC tax credit was restricted to low-
income parents working at least 16 hours per week. However, the new WFTC transfer
12See <http://archive.treasury.gov.uk/budget/1998/newsindx.htm> and <http://www.dwp.gov.uk/
publications/electronic-archive/press-releases/>.
13Over the pre-reform period, the BHPS collected information on newspaper readership only in the rst
two waves (1991 and 1992) and in waves 6 and 7 (1996 and 1997). The results mentioned here use data
from the 1997 wave only, but are robust to inclusion of the other three sweeps of data.
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program was more generous than FC in four important ways (see columns (1) and (3) in
Table 1): it had higher credits, particularly those for young children; it reduced net child
care costs; families could earn more before the benet began to be withdrawn; and it had
a lower withdrawal/taper rate. Overall, the reform increased the attractiveness of working
16 or more hours a week compared to working fewer hours. But the last of the four aspects
of the reform meant that the biggest income gains were expected to be experienced by
families just at the end of the FC taper (i.e., families whose earnings had reduced their
entitlement to FC to zero), who tended to be working full-time (Blundell, Brewer, and
Francesconi, 2008; Brewer et al., 2009).
Comparing the implementation parameters in column (3) of Table 1 to the correspond-
ing baseline parameters in column (1) gives an indication of the increased generosity of
the WFTC regime. Figure 7 provides another illustration of this greater generosity.14 In
absence of child care subsidies, we observe a gradual increase in benets with higher hours
of work levels. If the mother received Housing Benet (a rent subsidy), the rate of increase
was somewhat slower than that shown in the gure, due to the fact that the tax credit
was treated as income in other means-tested programs. But the main features remain the
same, with the greatest increases in benets falling to those in full-time employment, many
of whom would not have been eligible for a tax credit before the reform. Depending on the
amount of child care expenditures, the child care component of the tax credit could have
represented a considerable increase in generosity of the in-work benet program, beyond
that associated with the reduced earnings tax rate (taper rate) and increased earnings dis-
regard (threshold). This is illustrated in panel (a), which also shows the benet schedule
under WFTC in the case the child care component had been computed as it was under
FC, that is, as an earnings disregard.
To assess the overall work incentives associated with the reform, Figure 7(b) shows the
mother's budget constraint in the case where she used paid child care.15 The reform unam-
biguously improved the nancial incentive to take on eligible employment, and especially
full-time employment. The eect on hours of work for those already in eligible employment
was ambiguous, depending on the relative magnitude of income and substitution eects
14Since the increased credit for children aged 0{10 was accompanied by a equivalent increase for mothers
who worked fewer than 16 hours (or did not work at all) and received Income Support, Figure 7 ignores
this component to focus on the main work incentive eects of the program.
15As in Figure 7(b), FC benets and income at hours below 16 were calculated based on the higher
basic child credit rate under WFTC.
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for this group. Similarly, the child care tax credit, receipt of which was conditional on
eligible employment, had an unambiguous positive eect on labor force participation and
an ambiguous eect on hours for those in eligible work.
In sum, both news announcements and salience of the WFTC reform tended to foster
an already favorable economic climate, which in turn further encouraged work and self-
suciency among people in low-income families and with traditionally weak labor market
attachment, such as single mothers.
It is important to stress again that the WFTC reform was accompanied, preceded and
followed by changes in key parameters of other existing schemes, such as Income Support
and Child Benet, and by the introduction of new programs, such as the National Minimum
Wage and the various New Deal schemes.16 As emphasized in Francesconi and van der
Klaauw (2007), these other reforms were relevant to all women, and not just single mothers.
But, even though none targeted only single mothers, a number of possible interactions
between WFTC and other policy initiatives might have occurred. While disentangling the
eect of each individual policy is beyond the scope of this paper, in the empirical analysis
we will attempt to isolate, to the extent possible, the impact of WFTC. To do this, we use
single childless women (who were not eligible for WFTC benets) as our control group.
B. Data
We use samples from two data sources, each with advantages and disadvantages. The rst is
drawn from the rst twelve waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) collected
over the period 1991{2002.17 Since the Fall of 1991, the BHPS has annually interviewed a
representative random stratied sample of the population of Great Britain with about 5,500
households comprising more than 10,000 individuals. The survey's eldwork is typically
between September and December of each year. Our estimating sample includes unmarried
non-cohabiting females (separated, divorced, widowed and never married) who are at least
16 years old and were born after 1941 (thus aged at most 60 in 2002). We exclude any
female who was long-term ill or disabled, or in school full time in a given year. The
sample includes 3,474 single women, of whom 1,606 are lone mothers at any point during
16For a thorough description of such initiatives, see Card, Blundell, and Freeman (2004) and Brewer et
al. (2009).
17Detailed information on the BHPS is presented in Lynn et al. (2006) and can be obtained at
<http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/ulsc/bhps/doc/>.
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the survey period and the remaining 1,868 are childless. Although only 8 percent of the
women are observed in the same marital state for all 12 years of the panel, approximately
30 percent of them are observed for at least seven years in the same state. The resulting
sample size, after pooling the 12 years for both groups of women, is 15,260 observations
(5,616 lone mothers and 9,644 on childless women).
The second data source is the Family Resources Survey (FRS), for the period 1995{
2002.18 The advantage of the FRS over the BHPS is that it is a larger data set, collecting
information on over 20,000 households each year. Its disadvantage is that it is not a
longitudinal survey but a repeated cross-sectional survey, so the same individuals are not
followed over time. Observed changes in labor force behavior over time will therefore
partly reect changes in sample composition. Our FRS sample consists of unmarried non-
cohabiting women who are between 16 and 59 years old at the time of interview, and
excludes women with disabilities or in full-time education. The pooled sample has 76,886
women, of whom 28,468 are single mothers and 48,418 are single childless women.
Appendix Table A1 presents summary statistics of the outcomes as well as background
characteristics of the two groups of women. Although there are some small discrepancies
between the BHPS and the FRS gures, the similarities across samples are quite striking.
Both samples reveal some noticeable dierences in characteristics between single women
with and without children. Those who have children tend on average to be younger (es-
pecially in the BHPS), less educated (or more likely to have left school at age 18 in the
FRS), more likely to be nonwhite, and more likely to be in social housing or less likely
to be house owners. In addition, there are systematic dierences in employment behavior
of both groups of women. Compared to unmarried childless women, single mothers are
substantially less likely to be in any form of employment, whether eligible employment
(working 16 hours per week or more), or full time employment (working 30 hours per week
or more), or working any positive number of hours. Among those working, mothers also
work fewer hours. The other outcome (paid child care utilization) is only relevant for single
mothers.
Figure 8 plots the time trends of eligible employment over the sample period using the
18The FRS eldwork dates coincide with the scal year, covering the period April to March of the
following year. Because the WFTC reform was introduced in October 1999, that is, in the middle of the
eldwork of the 1998{1999 sweep, we re-timed each FRS data from October to September of the following
year. This makes the interpretation of the estimates easier and allows for a more direct comparison to the
BHPS results. Information on the FRS can be found at <http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/frs/>.
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BHPS data, which give us a longer time span than the FRS data. The trends based on the
FRS sample are qualitatively similar. Panel (a) shows the trends for single women with
and without children, while panel (b) disaggregates the single mothers' patterns into three
groups stratied by the age of the youngest dependent child (ages 0-4, 5-10, and 11-18).
The data reveal that single childless women had very stable labor market participation
patterns over the whole sample period. The participation rates of single mothers too were
stable with a small positive trend up to 1997, when they rose from about 40 to 43 percent in
1998 and further up, to nearly 48 percent, in 1999. Figure 8(b) suggests that the strongest
growth was experienced by women with children in the youngest age group (0-4 years),
who increased their participation rate from approximately 30 percent during the 1991-1997
period, to 45 percent in the 1999-2002 period. Interestingly, in 1998, the year preceding
the introduction of the reform, the eligible employment rates of mothers of pre-school and
school age children (0-4 and 5-10 years, respectively) increased quite substantially by about
5 percentage points.
C. Methods
To relate our analysis to existing evaluation studies of in-work benet reform as well as to
the model simulations and econometric implications discussed in Section II,19 let `it denote
a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if individual i is a lone mother and 0 otherwise, and
let s be the time period in which the reform occurs (i.e., s = 1999). We model the outcome
variable as being determined by the following specication
yit =  1 +  2`it + ( 31 +  32`it)t+ [ 41 +  42(t  s)] I(t  1999)
+1 `itI(t  1999) + 0`i I(t = 1998) +W0it#+ i + "it; (7)
where t varies from 1991 to 2002 for the BHPS sample and from 1995 to 2002 for the
FRS sample, Wit is a vector of individual characteristics, i represents unobserved time-
invariant xed eects (only included in the BHPS sample), and "it is an i.i.d. error term,
with E("itjWit; `it; i) = 0.
Equation (7) allows for dierent intercepts (when  2 6= 0) and dierent pre-reform linear
trends (when  32 6= 0) for control (single women without children) and treatment groups
19While an important topic for future research, estimating a full life-cycle version of the model in Section
II that also incorporates the tax structure and benet schedules facing single women during the period of
study is beyond the scope of the current paper.
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(single mothers). The parameters  41 and  42 measure possible shifts in the intercept and
slope of the process generating y following the reform. In our application, they capture the
eects of all other (non-WFTC) policy changes that occurred at s (e.g., the introduction
of the minimum wage). While our control group of single women without children was
ineligible for FC and WFTC benets and therefore not directly aected by the in-work
benet reform, both groups were potentially inuenced by the other policy initiatives
that took place in that year. By assuming that lone parents would have responded in
the same way to these other reforms, we net out the separate impact of WFTC, which
is captured in the equation by 1. Finally, to avoid evaluation biases from ignoring a
potential announcement eect associated with the introduction of the WFTC reform, we
explicitly allow for such an eect. This announcement eect is captured in (7) by 0.
Consequently, 1 represents the implementation eect of the pre-announced reform, as
previously discussed in Section II.C.20
Note that while allowing explicitly for announcement eects, our analysis assumes that
in years prior to 1998 single mothers had similar expectations about a future reform as
single childless women. If single mothers assigned a greater likelihood to a future reform in
prior years, then our results in Section II imply that estimates based on (7) may yield biased
estimates. Our earlier simulations suggest that such anticipatory eects would generally
be in the same direction as the announcement eect. Thus, there is a slight potential for
the estimated impacts presented below to be biased towards zero.
IV. Evidence
A. Labor Market Outcomes
Table 2 shows the estimated eects of the WFTC reform on eligible employment for both
the BHPS and the FRS samples. These are least squares estimates (OLS) based on linear
20It is worth noting that, because of the dierent eldwork coverage of the two surveys, the announcement
period in the BHPS is dierent from that in the FRS. In the former survey, it covers the period September{
December 1998, while in the latter, it refers to the period between October 1998 and September 1999.
Restricting the measurement of the announcement eect to the September{December 1998 period in the
FRS sample (thus dropping all the individuals whose information was collected between January and
September 1999) leads to a smaller sample size and larger standard errors around 0. But the results are
qualitatively similar to those presented below. Redening the announcement period in the FRS sample as
the period between March 1998 and September 1999 (that is, from the month of the Budget speech to the
month before the actual introduction of WFTC) leads to estimates of 0 that are close to those shown in
the next section and, usually, with smaller standard errors.
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probability models with group-specic pre-program trends and, in the case of the BHPS
sample, with individual xed eects (FE). Marginal eect estimates from probit regressions
on both samples and from Chamberlain xed-eects logit models on the BHPS sample were
very similar. Column (1) reports baseline results without announcement eect (i.e., 0 is
set equal to zero), while column (2) shows both implementation eect and announcement
eect estimates.
The implementation eect results in column (1) align remarkably well with the treat-
ment eect estimates reported in earlier studies (e.g., Brewer et al., 2006; Francesconi
and van der Klaauw, 2007; Gregg, Harkness, and Smith, 2009). The BHPS estimates are
around 5 percentage points and are a little larger than those found with the FRS sample.21
In fact, the latter are closer to those reported in Blundell and Hoynes (2004) and Blundell
et al. (2004), which were also obtained using FRS data. Accounting for an announcement
eect leads to substantially larger implementation eect estimates. The OLS results in
both samples show an increase by about 20 percent, raising the rate at which lone mothers
worked 16 or more hours per week up to 6 and 4 percentage points in the BHPS and FRS
samples, respectively.
The announcement eect itself is positive and large, representing a 3 percentage point
increase in the BHPS and a 2 percentage point increase in the FRS. The eect is statistically
signicant in the BHPS sample (albeit only at the 10 percent level in the case of the FE
regressions), but it is not in the FRS sample. Together, these results provide evidence of
a sizeable announcement eect.
Earlier studies have suggested that the positive labor supply response of single mothers
was predominantly driven by an increase in full-time employment, that is, working 30
hours per week or more (Blundell and Hoynes, 2004; Francesconi and van der Klaauw,
2007). Column (1) in the top panel of Table 3 conrms this evidence for both BHPS
and FRS samples. When we allow for announcement eects (column (2)), the ndings of
Table 2 emerge again. Depending on the sample, the rate at which lone mothers worked
full time increased by between 4 and 5 percentage points over the post-reform period,
while the announcement eect estimates vary between nearly 2 and 2.6 percentage points.
The upper bound of such estimate is found in the BHPS sample with the OLS regression,
21Findings reported later in Section V provide a possible explanation for the size dierence between the
BHPS- and FRS-based estimates.
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while the lower bound emerges in the FE model applied to the BHPS sample and in the
FRS sample. Notice further that all such announcement eect estimates are statistically
signicant and positive.22
Another way to assess how the WFTC announcement inuenced single mothers' be-
havior is to analyze hours worked. If all women are considered (that is, including those
with zero hours of work), the estimates in panel C of Table 3 indicate that accounting
for announcement eects increases the estimated impact of WFTC on hours worked by
almost 40 percent in the BHPS sample regardless of the estimation method, and by 20
percent in the FRS sample. In either case, the estimate of 0 is statistically signicant and
large, ranging between 2 and 2.5 extra hours of work per week and representing 50 percent
of the implementation eect. Restricting the focus only to women with positive hours of
work, however, changes our results (panel D): the increase in the estimated implementation
eect is more modest (especially in the BHPS sample), while the announcement eect is
small and always insignicant, which is consistent with the theoretically ambiguous eect
predicted for this group of women.
There is also evidence that WFTC had a stronger employment impact on mothers with
one young child than on mothers with multiple older children (Francesconi and van der
Klaauw, 2007; Gregg, Harkness, and Smith, 2009). A stronger impact of the reform for
this subgroup of mothers is consistent with the fact that the increase in the total tax credit
(including a larger child care tax credit) under WFTC was especially large for mothers of
young children. The estimates in column (1) of Table 4 uphold this result across samples
and estimation techniques, although in the FRS sample we also nd some signicant em-
ployment response amongst mothers with two or more children and the youngest child aged
0{4. Allowing for announcement eects again raises the overall impact of the signicant
implementation eect estimates by about 20 percent (column (2)). For example, a lone
mother with one child aged 0{4 increased her probability of being in eligible employment
by 8.3 percentage points in the FRS sample (a 25 percent increase), and by 9.6 percentage
points in the BHPS sample (FE model, a 13 percent increase). Again, in both samples and
irrespective of the estimation method, the WFTC announcement leads to a statistically
signicant increase in the eligible employment rate of mothers of children aged 0{10. This
22Similar evidence is revealed when we look at the rate at which single mothers were in paid employment
(panel B), although the estimated announcement eects are never statistically signicant at conventional
levels either across samples or across estimating models.
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increase is large (ranging between 3 and 5 percentage points) and represents approximately
40 percent of the corresponding total WFTC eect estimate. The larger anticipation ef-
fects is consistent with the larger overall eect of the WFTC reform for single mothers
with pre-school children, who indeed were expected to benet the most from the reform.
B. Interpretation
According to the model of Section II, the direction and magnitude of anticipation and an-
nouncement eects on employment of single mothers depend on the relative importance of
search frictions, human capital accumulation, habit persistence, and intertemporal sub-
stitution due to preferences and saving. Our empirical results reveal a large positive
announcement eect on the employment of single mothers, especially those with young
children. This nding implies that the factors contributing to a positive eect (i.e., search
frictions, returns to human capital, and habit persistence) dominated those that would
have led to a negative impact (i.e., intertemporal substitution and saving).
Micro-based empirical work has long documented, and provided evidence that is con-
sistent with, relatively small intertemporal labor supply elasticities (e.g., MaCurdy, 1981;
Ashenfelter, 1984; Altonji, 1986; Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), Ham and Reilly, 2002;
French, 2004; and the meta-analysis by Chetty et al., 2011a).23 Even were the intertem-
poral elasticity to be moderately sized, as argued in Lee (2001) and Ziliak and Kniesner
(2005), using savings to nance future increases in labor supply is unlikely to play a very
important role in this reform. Data from the rst twelve waves of the BHPS show that
just over one-third of lone mothers reported saving from current income. In addition,
they reported saving relatively small amounts of money. The mean monthly amount saved
among all lone mothers was around $31 (corresponding to less than 8 percent of gross
monthly earnings), while the average amount among savers was $89. Given this evidence,
it is therefore not very surprising that we did not nd a decline in employment rates in
anticipation of the implementation of WFTC.
The question is then to identify the factor(s) which may be responsible for the strong
labor supply increase prior to the reform. Among the mechanisms that could explain
23These studies do not allow for frictions or human capital eects. Imai and Keane (2004) nd larger
intertemporal substitution elasticities after accounting for human capital accumulation eects in a lifecycle
labor supply model. In our framework, human capital eects, as well as labor market frictions, can
encourage responses to announcement eects since experience increases the value of future labor supply.
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a positive announcement eect, human capital accumulation is unlikely to have been an
important pathway. This is because of the relatively small additional expected wage return
(on top of the WFTC induced net wage increase) from one additional year of experience.
Wage experience proles have been found to be atter for women, and especially for lower
educated and unskilled workers, than for other workers (Dustmann and Meghir, 2005;
Connolly and Gottschalk, 2006). In their study of single parents in the Canadian Self-
Suciency Program, Card and Hyslop (2005) nd little evidence of long term impact on
wages of those who have experienced higher levels of labor supply. There is also little
empirical evidence that supports a signicant role of habit persistence in women's work
decisions. Estimates from life cycle models of female labor supply typically nd no evidence
of habit persistence (Eckstein and Wolpin, 1989; Francesconi, 2002).
Based on the existing evidence, therefore, our ndings point to short-run labor market
frictions as the main explanation for the observed employment increase, with women en-
tering or remaining in the labor market to be in a position to benet from the announced
reform the following year.24 There is evidence that American single mothers are likely to
be employed in short-lived jobs (Card and Blank, 2000).25 If this were to be true also
for British lone mothers, then the motivation for early entry into (or delayed exit out of)
employment between the WFTC announcement and its implementation based on search
frictions may be weak. In this case, we would expect many of the jobs that were started
following the announcement to have terminated by the time the reform was introduced.
There are two reasons for why we do not believe this argument to hold for the single
mothers in our study. First, even if jobs held by single mothers were to be short-lived, if
having a job (versus not working) makes it easier to move to another job and to remain
employed, the prospects of WFTC benets would still provide an incentive to enter and
remain in the labor force.26 Second, it actually turns out that lone mothers who started
24In line with this interpretations, Chetty et al. (2011b) use Danish tax records to document that labor
market frictions play a signicant role in shaping labor supply responses to tax changes.
25Recent U.S. evidence, however, documents that welfare recipients, many of which are single mothers,
have fairly low turnover rates and high job retention rates as compared to other (non-welfare recipient)
employees in comparable jobs (Holzer, Stoll, and Wissoker, 2004). In addition, Farber (2008) shows that,
although long-term employment relationships have become much less common for men in the private
sector, women have seen no systematic change in job durations over the last 30 years. Similar results for
women have also emerged for Canada (Heisz, 2005).
26As pointed out by Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994), in Britain twice as many workers chose to look
for work whilst employed, rather than quit into full-time search unemployment, suggesting that searching
on the job is an important mechanism for labor market transitions.
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new jobs in our sample during the 1997{2000 period on average kept jobs with a median
tenure of 36 months.27 For these reasons we see labor market frictions as the most credible
explanation for the strong, positive anticipation eects.
As a further, more direct piece of evidence, we checked whether single mothers who lived
in areas with greater labor market frictions responded dierently from those who lived in
areas with weaker frictions. To ascertain this, we matched labor market information on 306
travel-to-work areas to our BHPS sample. A woman was dened to have faced high (low)
labor market frictions if she lived in a travel-to-work area with an above (below) average
stock of unemployment.28 We then repeated the analysis of Table 3 after interacting the
friction indicator with the announcement and implementation eect variables as well as
the single mother group and trend measures. The results indicate that, although there
is no signicant dierence in implementation eects between women in high friction and
low friction areas, announcement eects are almost 50 percent larger for women in high
friction areas (with the dierence being statistically signicant at the 10 percent level).
This evidence lines up well with our friction story, according to which single mothers
in slacker labor markets had an incentive to be in eligible employment even before the
introduction of the reform.
V. Other Outcomes and Sensitivity Analysis
A. Paid and Unpaid Child Care Utilization
One of the drivers of the eects of the WFTC reform has been identied in the increase in
the tax credit provided to cover child care costs (Blundell and Hoynes, 2004; Francesconi
and van der Klaauw, 2007; Brewer et al., 2009). The estimates in the rst column of
Table 5 (panel A) indicate that the introduction of WFTC led to an increase in the use of
paid child care services of about 2-3 percentage points in both samples and regardless of
27For this analysis, we used the wave-on-wave job history information collected by the BHPS and
considered job durations of all the women who entered paid job at the time of interview in the 1997{2000
period. For robustness purposes, we also computed job durations using a sample of unpartnered women
drawn from the 1998-2000 Labour Force Surveys (LFS) and found a very similar median job tenure.
Moreover, for British single mothers over the years in our sample period, Yeo (2007) reports a median
duration of 30 months for a full-time job and of 18 months for a job in eligible employment.
28Since 2000, job centers stopped providing information on vacancies and labor force stock. Thus,
standard measures of labor market tightness and unemployment/vacancy ratios could not be computed at
the travel-to-work area over the whole BHPS sample. As an additional robustness exercise, we re-dened
the presence of labor market frictions on the basis of unemployment inows and found results that are
similar to those discussed in the text.
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the estimating method. A similar response emerges also when announcement eects are
accounted for. But the 1998 announcement of the reform was not followed by an immediate
change in formal child care utilization. The announcement eect estimates are always very
small and highly insignicant.
This result is conrmed when we disaggregate implementation and announcement ef-
fects by age of the youngest child and number of children (panel B). Lone mother with
only one child aged 0{4 experienced the greatest increase in the probability of using paid
child care services of approximately 4 percentage points, compared to an increase of 3 per-
centage points for those with one child aged 5{10. Accounting for announcement eects,
however, does not alter any of the implementation eect estimates, and the announcement
impact estimates are small and never (individually or jointly) signicant.
In panels C and D, where we focus on unpaid child care usage, however, we nd exactly
the opposite results. That is, there is evidence of strong announcement eects and of no
implementation eect along this margin. The announcement eects emerge especially in
the case of mothers of one child of pre-school or school age, i.e., those women who showed
sizeable implementation eects in formal child care utilization.
The switch from informal to formal child care utilization at the time of the WFTC
reform can be explained by the fact that, up to that time, paid child care services were rel-
atively expensive. In the years preceding WFTC, Family Credit was not generous towards
child care expenditures, since it only allowed a small fraction of eligible child care costs to
be disregarded from the calculation of net family income, rather than adding those costs to
the maximum credit as done under WFTC. Therefore, forward-looking single mothers who
wanted to take advantage of the benets oered by the WFTC reform had an incentive to
enter the labor market prior to its implementation because of frictions in the labor market.
Meanwhile they had to nd (temporary) arrangements for their children | typically with
relatives, neighbors, and unregistered childminders | before placing them in daycare cen-
ters or other formal child care arrangements after the introduction of WFTC, when they
would have been entitled to receive a substantial child care tax credit top-up.
B. Transitions in the Labor Market and Child Care Usage
We take advantage of the panel nature of the BHPS sample and examine year-to-year
employment transitions. That is, we estimate announcement and implementation eects
27
both on the probability of staying in eligible employment (i.e., conditioning on yit 1 = 1),
and on the probability of starting a job with 16 or more hours of work per week (i.e.,
conditioning on yit 1 = 0). We refer to the former as the persistence probability and the
latter as the entry probability. The results are reported in Table 6.
The introduction of WFTC increased single mothers' persistence probability by almost
6 percentage points. When announcement eects are accounted for (column 2), this eect
rises by 20 percent to 7 percentage points, while the probability of staying in eligible
employment between the Fall of 1997 and the Fall of 1998 (roughly six months after the
ocial announcement in Parliament) went up as well, by almost 2.5 percentage points.
Entry rates into WFTC-eligible jobs show similar patterns. While the magnitude of the
eects is generally slightly smaller, the increase applies to a larger base of single mothers
not in eligible employment prior to 1998. These results point again to the importance of
labor supply decisions that were taken between the announcement of the reform and its
implementation, which are consistent with the presence of labor market imperfections.
We build on the previous results on child care usage and examine labor market transi-
tions jointly with child care utilization decisions. Four processes are estimated using the
BHPS sample, the results of which are in Table 7. We begin with the transition from
nonwork (including non-eligible employment) to eligible employment with paid child care
services. The estimates (in the rst row of the table) reveal a strong positive implemen-
tation eect of 3.9 percentage points. That is, almost three-quarters of the mothers who
entered eligible employment as a result of the reform did so by also choosing to use paid
child care services. This eect, however, was not preceded by any similar change in the
previous year. The previous year instead witnessed an increase of 2.1 percentage points
in the probability of entering eligible employment (from nonwork) with reliance on unpaid
child care services (second row). These results strongly uphold our earlier story based on
forward looking behavior and labor market imperfections. Single mothers anticipated the
introduction of the 1999 reform by entering eligible employment while using informal child
care, when Family Credit did not provide a generous support to child care expenditures.
With the introduction of WFTC, they stayed in eligible employment but took advantage
of the more generous support to child care costs and switched to paid child care services.
The next two transition processes shown in Table 7 conrm this interpretation. About
two-thirds of the increase in the persistence probability in eligible employment (measured in
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Table 6) are driven by mothers who moved to paid child care services after the introduction
of the reform (third row). Conversely, the whole anticipation eect in the same persistence
probability can be attributed to women who did not rely on formal child care arrangements.
As mentioned earlier, press coverage around the time of the Budget speech in March
1998 when WFTC was formally announced, was considerable, especially during the Februa-
ry-April period. The existence and timing of anticipation eects is based on information
diusion, similar to the way that news announcements matter in nancial markets (An-
dersen et al., 2003). We therefore examine whether or not our results match with the
timing of that announcement. In particular, if the employment changes estimated for
1998 were concentrated after March of that year (seasonal eects apart), they could be
seen more credibly as a behavioral adjustment in response to the announcement in 1998
of the 1999 policy reform. On the other hand, if such changes were equally spread over
time before and after the Budget speech, that interpretation would be harder to defend.
Figure 9(a) shows monthly rates in eligible employment for single women without children
and for lone mothers between September 1997 and December 1998. While the employ-
ment rate of single childless women increased by less than 1 percentage point over that
period, the employment rate of single mothers increased by 3.5 percentage points (from 38
to 41.5 percent). Interestingly, 82 percent (about 2.9 percentage points) of that increase
occurred during the April-July period. This result is consistent with the presence of an
announcement eect.
Another way of documenting the importance of the WFTC announcement is to look at
the distribution of dates (months) in which women who were in employment at the time
of the 1998 interview started a job since the previous September. The distributions for
single childless women and lone mothers, which include both job-to-job transitions and new
labor market entries, are plotted in Figure 9(b). Of the new jobs that lone mothers started
between September 1997 and December 1998, 62 percent commenced after March 1998,
whereas only 51 percent of the new jobs started by unmarried women without children
began after the Budget speech.
C. Sensitivity Analysis
To demonstrate the robustness of the results, we performed a number of sensitivity checks.
First, because on average single mothers achieve lower educational levels, we restricted the
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control group to single childless women with educational qualications below A level and
repeated the analysis using the BHPS sample.29 This restriction marginally reduces both
implementation and announcement eects, but the estimates (not shown) are still signi-
cant and not statistically dierent from those reported in Tables 2 and 3. Second, to model
the pre-reform trend more exibly, we repeated our analysis including quadratic (rather
than linear) pre-program trends. Irrespective of the estimating sample, this alternative
specication did not alter any of the key ndings of the study.
Third, similar results also emerged when we restricted both samples to single women
aged 55 or less, a restriction that was motivated by the observation that single mothers tend
to be more concentrated in the middle of the age distribution. Fourth, to account for the
fact that the FRS interviews individuals over the entire year rather than the September-
December period (as typically done in the BHPS), we included indicators for the season
(quarter) of interview. The inclusion of such indicators does not aect any of the results.
A further sensitivity test relates to the dierence in surveying periods covered by the
two surveys under analysis. This may have an eect on how pre-program trends can in-
uence the evaluation analysis. To gain insight into this issue, we re-estimated the BHPS
sample using data only from the 1995 wave onwards, covering the same time period as the
FRS. The results for the labor market outcomes are reported in Table 8. Both implemen-
tation and announcement eect estimates are generally smaller than those found in the
full BHPS sample. Importantly, the announcement eects along full-time employment and
hours of work remain positive and statistically signicant, while those along eligible em-
ployment and the work/nowork margin lose statistical signicance, as was the case when
these were estimated using the FRS sample. Similar patterns are revealed by the employ-
ment transition estimates, with smaller (but positive and still signicant) implementation
eects, and smaller and insignicant announcement eects in both cases. These results,
therefore, reveal that some of the dierence in the magnitude of the estimated eects based
on the BHPS and FRS data, and especially the implementation eects, might be driven by
the dierent years covered by the two surveys and the associated length of the pre-reform
period.
29The same exercise cannot be repeated on the FRS sample. As shown in Appendix Table A1, the FRS
does not contain detailed information on educational qualications, but only on whether an individual left
full time education at age 18.
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VI. Conclusion
In a world in which agents are forward looking, behavior may respond not only to the
actual implementation of public policy reforms but also in anticipation of such reforms. The
potential presence of anticipation and announcement eects has important implications for
policy evaluation. If a reform is anticipated or announced in advance of its introduction,
this anticipatory behavior may aect the ultimate size of the overall impact of the reform.
Moreover, an anticipated reform that is not implemented can also generate behavioral
responses.
In this paper we consider the implications of such anticipatory behavior for the eval-
uation of welfare reform impacts as commonly conducted. We illustrate these issues by
analyzing potential labor supply responses to a simple in-work benet reform that increases
a worker's net earnings. Using a simple dynamic model of female labor force decisions, we
discuss various channels and mechanisms through which the anticipation or announcement
of a reform could generate pre-reform employment responses. We also discuss how such
anticipatory behavior aects the interpretation and estimation of program impacts, for
example when adopting standard dierences in dierences methods.
We then provide an empirical application which looks at single mothers' labor supply
behavior in relation to the Working Families' Tax Credit, a major in-work benet reform
introduced in Britain in October 1999 and formally announced by the UK government 18
months earlier in March 1998. By documenting the precise timing of announcement and
implementation, our analysis uncovers strong evidence of announcement eects of WFTC
on single mothers' labor supply. These eects turn out to be positive, and consistent
with the presence of frictions in the labor market that cause women to work between the
announcement and the actual introduction of the reform in order to increase the chance
that they could benet from the new, more generous, tax credit after its introduction.
The magnitude of the estimated announcement eect is large, typically half the size of
the corresponding estimated implementation eects. In addition, implementation eect
estimates that ignore announcement eects are biased downward, in the order of 15 to 35
percent. These results are robust to dierent labor market outcome measures and to a
number of sensitivity checks.
In the case of paid (formal) child care utilization, we nd sizeable implementation
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eects, but no announcement eect. Conversely, there are large announcement eects
and no implementation eect in the case of unpaid (informal) child care utilization. This
again reveals cogent evidence of forward looking behavior. Women in fact had to pay for
formal child care services without receiving benets directly to cover such costs before the
introduction of WFTC. Instead, they would have received a generous child care tax credit
after its implementation. Results based on transitions of child care decisions conrm this
interpretation.
The role and consequences of anticipatory behavior for the evaluation of welfare re-
forms represents an important and relatively understudied topic for future research. Our
analysis in this paper suggests that such behavior can signicantly aect estimates of the
reform's overall eectiveness. It also highlights the importance of identifying and measur-
ing announcements, information and beliefs regarding future reforms. As pointed out by
Chetty, Looney, Kroft (2009) and Chetty and Saez (2009), the eects of policies will vary
substantially depending on their information and salience characteristics.
Economists in recent years have begun to devote considerable eort to the collection
and analysis of data on subjective expectations and belief (Manski, 2004). As shown in
this paper, to explore the presence and importance of anticipatory behavior, it will be
important for economists to collect more data on individual's beliefs and expectations
regarding the likelihood and nature of future welfare reforms and of social interventions
more generally.
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Appendix A
Solution to the Dynamic Program
The standard solution method for nite horizon dynamic programming problems is back-
ward recursion. Letting Vit(Ait 1; Xit 1; dt; it) be the maximum of expected discounted
remaining lifetime utility given assets Ait 1, Xit 1 prior periods of employment, implemen-
tation of welfare reform d and a wage draw of it, then
Vit(Ait 1; Xit 1; dt; it) = max[V 1it (Ait 1; Xit 1; dt; it); V
0
it (Ait 1; Xit 1; dt)];
where V 1it () and V 0it () denote the expected discounted (remaining) lifetime utilities if the
woman i works in current period t (yit = 1) and does not work (yit = 0) respectively. At
the terminal period (t = 3), the value functions when Ji3 = f0; 1g are:
V 1i3(Ai2; Xi2; d3; i3) = Ui3(ci3 = (1 + r)Ai2 + wi3 +Ni3; yi3 = 1) (A.1)
V 0i3(Ai2; Xi2; d3) = Ui3(ci3 = (1 + r)Ai2 +Ni3; yi3 = 0) (A.2)
The woman works if V 1it () is greater than V 0it (). The decision rule governing the partici-
pation decision at t = 3 is then given by
yi3(Ai2; Xi2; d3; i3) = 1 i V
1
i3(Ai2; Xi2; d3; i3) > V
0
i3(Ai2; Xi2; d3);
yi3(Ai2; Xi2; d3; i3) = 0 otherwise:
Thus, the expected value in period 3 for a woman who does not face search frictions is
EV
f0;1g
i3 (Ai2; Xi2; d3) =
Z
[yi3(Ai2; Xi2; d3; i3)V
1
i3(Ai2; Xi2; d3; i3)
+(1  yi3(Ai2; Xi2; d3; i3))V 0i3(Ai2; Xi2; d3)]f(i3)di3 (A.3)
where f() represents the logistic density function.
In the case in which Ji3= f0g, that is, when the woman has no job available because
of labor market frictions, the expected value is
EV
f0g
i3 (Ai2; Xi2; d3) = V
0
i3(Ai2; Xi2; d3): (A.4)
Combining (A.3) and (A.4) yields the expected remaining lifetime utility value to each
woman for period 3, namely
EVi3(Ai2; Xi2; yi2; d3)=3(yi2)EV
f0;1g
i3 (Ai2; Xi2; d3)+(1 3(yi2))EV f0gi3 (Ai2; Xi2; d3);
where the expected value function now also explicitly depends on the previous period's
employment choice yit 1, and with 3(1)=1.
At time t = 2, the value functions corresponding to (A.1) and (A.2) will have to account
for beliefs regarding the possible implementation of a reform in period 3. In addition, agents
now optimally choose both their employment and consumption levels. The value functions
when woman i works and when she does not work are given respectively by
V 1i2(Ai1; Xi1; d2; i2) = max
0cK(1)
fUi2(c; yi2 = 1) + 23(d2)EVi3[K(1)  c;Xi1 + 1; 1; 1]
+(1  23(d2))EVi3[K(1)  c;Xi1 + 1; 1; 0]g
V 0i2(Ai1; Xi1; d2) = max
0cK(0)
fUi2(c; yi2 = 0) + 23(d2)EVi3[K(0)  c;Xi1; 0; 1]
+(1  23(d2))EVi3[K(0)  c;Xi1; 0; 0]g:
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where K(yi2) = (1+ r)Ai1+wi2yi2+Ni2 and where it is important to recall again that
23(1)=1. Then, the decision rule at t=2 when in receipt of a job oer is
yi2(Ai1; Xi1; d2; i2) = 1 i V
1
i2(Ai1; Xi1; d2; i2) > V
0
i2(Ai1; Xi2; d2);
yi2(Ai1; Xi1; d2; i2) = 0 otherwise:
while, if no job oer was received (when Ji1=f0g), then yi2=0:
As in the case of the last period, the expected value to each woman is a weighted sum
of the value which is expected when jobs are available and the value expected when there
is no job available. Therefore, for any given beliefs about the likelihood of a reform at
t=3, 23, we have
EVi2(Ai1; Xi1; yi1; d2j23) = 2(yi1)EV f0;1gi2 (Ai1; Xi1; d2j23)
+(1  2(yi1))EV f0gi2 (Ai1; Xi1; d2j23); (A.5)
where the choice-specic expected value functions in (A.5) are given by
EV
f0;1g
i2 (Ai1; Xi1; d2j23) =
Z
[yi2(Ai1; Xi1; d2; i2)V
1
i2(Ai1; Xi1; d2; i2)
+[1  yi2(Ai1; Xi1; d2; i2)]V 0i2(Ai1; Xi1; d2)]f(i2)d(i2)
EV
f0g
i2 (Ai1; Xi1j23) = V 0i2(Ai1; Xi1; d2):
Finally, in period t = 1, in which Xi0 is given (and set equal to zero for simplicity),
the value functions depending on whether woman i works or does not work are given
respectively by
V 1i1(Ai0; Xi0; i1) = max
0cK(1)
fUi1(c; yi1 = 1) + 12EVi2[K(1)  c;Xi0 + 1; 1; 1j13]
+(1  12)EVi2(K(1)  c;Xi0 + 1; 1; 0j13)g
V 0i1(Ai0; Xi0) = max
0cK(0)
fUi1(c; yi1 = 0) + 12EVi2[K(0)  c;Xi0; 0; 1j13]
+(1  12)EVi2(K(0)  c;Xi0; 0; 0j13)g;
where K(yi1)=(1+r)Ai0+wi1yi1+Ni1, while 12 and 13 are the agent's perceived likelihoods
in period 1 of a reform occurring in periods 2 and 3, respectively. The decision rule in a
frictionless world (when Ji1=f0; 1g) is then
yi1(Ai0; Xi0; i1) = 1 i V
1
i1(Ai0; Xi0; i1) > V
0
i1(Ai0; Xi1);
yi1(Ai0; Xi0; i1) = 0 otherwise;
while, regardless of the realization of i1, y

i1 is always equal to 0 in an economy with job
market frictions, that is, when Ji1=f0g.
In solving the optimal consumption and employment choices in the dynamic program-
ming problem, we used standard value function approximation methods, where for each
possible value of (Xit 1; yit 1; dt); EVi3(Ai2; Xi2; yi2; d3) was approximated by a quadratic
function in assets. These approximations were very close, with R2 values always greater
than 0.99.
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Appendix B
A Description of the WFTC Program
Up to April 2003, the main in-work support program in the UK has been the Working
Families' Tax Credit (WFTC), which replaced Family Credit (FC) on October 5, 1999.30
Along with other active labor market programs (such as the various welfare-to-work \New
Dea" schemes) and the introduction of the National Minimum Wage, WFTC had a crucial
part in the central government's antipoverty strategy. By the end of 2002, it reached
almost 2.7 million children in 1.4 million families (a 70-percent increase from November
1998 when FC was still in place), and at a cost of around $6 billion a year (approximately
10 billion in current US dollars). To put these gures into perspective, in February 2003,
a total of 2.5 million children were living in families claiming at least one of the other
key means-tested welfare benets, including Income Support and Housing Benets, while
the government spending on, say, Income Support alone | the primary cash transfer to
low-income nonworking individuals (in many respects similar to AFDC or TANF in the
United States) | was around $13 billion a year.
A family needs to meet three basic requirements in order to be eligible for WFTC.
First, at least one adult in the family (or the lone parent in a single-parent family) must
work 16 hours or more per week.31 Second, the family must have at least one dependent
child. A dependent child is a child, grandchild, stepchild or foster child of the family who
is under the age of 16 (or under 19 if in full-time non-university education). Third, family
savings and capital must be below a given amount (which, in current prices, was set at
$8,000 over our entire sample period) and net family income must be suciently low. In
fact, families with incomes below a specied \threshold" or \applicable amount" (which
increased from $62.25 per week in 1991 to $92.90 per week in 2001) receive maximum
credit; when incomes are greater than the threshold, the maximum credit is reduced by
a proportion (known as \taper rate") of the dierence between net family income and
threshold. Besides net family income and hours worked, the amount of the weekly credit
to which a family is entitled depends on the number and ages of children and child care
costs, in the form of a basic child credit and a child care credit.
There are a few parameters through which the WFTC reform potentially increased
the generosity of in-work support relative to FC. First, the WFTC system substantially
increased the credit for younger children in the age group 0-10. The nominal increment
of $5 per week represents a 34 percent increase between 1998 and 1999 (while the annual
increase of the credit for children in the same age group between 1991 and 1998 was, on
average, 6.6 percent only). Second, the income threshold grew by 14 percent from $79
to $90 per week, whereas its average annual growth in each of the previous eight years
had been 3.4 percent. Third, the taper rate at which earnings above the threshold are
taxed was lowered from 70 percent to 55 percent. Fourth, WFTC is more generous with
30More detailed descriptions of the program are in Blundell and Hoynes (2004) and Francesconi and van
der Klaauw (2007). It should be noted that, in April 2003 and thus after the end of our sample period,
WFTC was itself replaced by two new tax credits: the Child Tax Credit (CTC) and the Working Tax
Credit (WTC).
31At its introduction in 1988, Family Credit set the minimum hour cuto at 24 hours per week, which
was reduced to 16 in 1992. In addition, from July 1995, FC was modied to provide an extra $10 credit
for those working 30 hours per week or more. This feature was retained by the WFTC reform, with the
additional credit set at $11.15 in October 1999.
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eligible child care costs.32 From October 1994, FC allowed eligible child care costs (up to
a maximum amount, which was $60 per week just before WFTC was introduced) to be
disregarded from the calculation of net family income.33 This meant that the maximum
child care support was $70 per week for a family with one child, and $105 per week for a
family with two or more children.
To get an idea of the impact of the reform, consider a single mother with one child aged
6, who works more than 16 hours per week (but less than 30), has net earnings of $150
per week and pays $60 per week for child care. In 1999 under the WFTC regime, she
would receive a credit of $81.15 per week. In 1998 under the FC regime, the same woman
with the same characteristics would receive a credit of $56.80 per week (in constant 1999
prices), that is 43 percent less than in 1999. If the woman had net earnings of $200 per
week, her credit in both years would be lower, but in 1999 she would receive 2.5 times
more than she would in 1998 ($53.65 versus $21.25 per week). For the empirical earnings
and child care expenditures distributions of mothers working 16 or more hours per week in
1998, and assuming no behavioral responses, the reform implied an average credit increase
of about 20 percent (from an average of $42 to almost $50 per week), with a quarter of
those mothers seeing an increase of at least 50 percent.
Unlike FC, WFTC was not administered by the Benets Agency but by Inland Revenue.
In line with the government's eort to reduce the potential stigma associated with claiming
in-work benets, this administrative feature and the receipt of the credit through the wage
packet directly from the employer were intended to emphasize that WFTC was indeed a
tax credit rather than a welfare benet (H.M. Treasury, 1998). Therefore, while in many
respects WFTC was similar to EITC in the United States, it diered from it in that WFTC
had no phase-in rate but instead a minimum hours requirement of 16 per week, it had a
higher phase-out rate (taper rate), included a generous child care tax credit, and it was
administered and paid out dierently.
32To be \eligible" (or \relevant"), child care services must be provided by registered child minders, day
nurseries, and after-school clubs, or certain other special schools or establishments that are exempt from
registration. Relevant child care can be for any child in the family up to age 11 until May 1998, or up to
age 12 from June 1998 to May 2000, or up to age 15 from June 2000 onward.
33This was the disregard for families with one child. In 1998 a disregard of $100 was introduced for
families with two or more children.
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Table 1: Key Parameters of the Tax Credits at Baseline (FS regime), at Announcement, and at WFTC
Implementation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1998 1998 Budget 1999 Dierence
(FS regime) (Announcement) (WFTC regime) (c){(b)
Basic rate $48.80 $48.80 $52.30 $3.50
[$49.78] (+7.2%)
[+5.1%]
Additional credit
for working 30+ hours $10.80 $10.80 $11.15 $0.35
[$11.02] (+3.2%)
[+1.2%]
Credit for child aged:
0{10 $14.85 $17.35 $19.85 $2.50
[$17.70] (+14.4%)
[+12.1%]
11{15 $20.45 $20.45 $20.90 $0.45
[$20.86] (+2.2%)
[+0.2%]
16{18 $25.40 $25.40 $25.95 $0.55
[$25.91] (+2.2%)
[+0.2%]
Taper rate 70% 55% 55% none
Threshold $79.00 $90.00 $90.00 none
Childcare tax credit Costs deducted 70% of up to: 70% of up to: none
from earnings $100 (1 kid) $100 (1 kid)
$150 (2+ kids) $150 (2+ kids)
Notes: Figures are in nominal values, except those in square brackets in column (2), which are expressed in
constant 1999 prices using the Retail Price Index. In column (4), the gures in parentheses are percentages
computed over the corresponding gures in column (2), while those in square brackets are percentages computed
over the corresponding gures in square brackets in column (2).
Table 2: WFTC Implementation and Announcement Eects | Eligible Employment
BHPS (N=15,260)a FRS (N=76,886)b
(1) (2) (1) (2)
OLS
Implementation (1) 0.051 0.060 0.033 0.040
(0.016) (0.018) (0.008) (0.011)
Announcement (0) 0.029 0.018
(0.014) (0.016)
FE
Implementation (1) 0.049 0.059
(0.018) (0.019)
Announcement (0) 0.027
(0.015)
Sources: British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), 1991-2002; Family Resources Survey (FRS), 1995/96-2002/03.
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Estimates in bold are signicant at the 5 percent level. N
denotes the number of observations. The dependent variable is equal to one if a woman works 16 or more hours
per week, and zero otherwise. `Announcement' stands for announcement eect as captured by 0 in (7). It is
measured over the period that goes from March 1998 to September 1999 in the FRS sample; whereas in the BHPS
sample it is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the interview wave is 1998. `Implementation' stands for
implementation eect as captured by 1 in (7). It is measured over the period that goes from October 1999 to
December 2001 in the FRS sample; while in the BHPS sample it is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the
interview waves are 1999 (after October 5), 2000 or 2001. The other variables used in estimation are a quartic
polynomial in age, number of children by age group (3 groups: ages 0-4, ages 5-10, and ages 11-18), dummy
variables for ethnic origin (4 dummies; white is the base category), highest educational level in the BHPS sample
(5; no qualication) and whether left full-time education at age 18 in the FRS sample, housing tenure (2; owner),
region of residence (16; Greater London), interaction terms of a woman's age with number of children by age
group and with her education, interaction terms of a woman's education with number of children by age group,
and group specic linear trends.
a Estimates are obtained from linear probability models without and with individual xed eects (OLS and FE,
respectively).
b Estimates are obtained from linear probability models (OLS only).
Table 3: WFTC Implementation and Announcement Eects | Other Employment Outcomes
BHPS FRS
(1) (2) (1) (2)
(1) (1) (0) (1) (1) (0)
Panel A: Full time employmenta
OLS 0.045 0.054 0.026 0.030 0.039 0.019
(0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009)
FE 0.042 0.049 0.020
(0.020) (0.021) (0.009)
Panel B: Employmentb
OLS 0.056 0.061 0.017 0.052 0.058 0.016
(0.017) (0.020) (0.014) (0.020) (0.021) (0.012)
FE 0.052 0.055 0.019
(0.017) (0.019) (0.014)
Panel C: Hours workedc
OLS 3.32 4.60 2.41 3.58 4.21 1.91
(0.73) (0.93) (0.75) (0.77) (0.90) (0.56)
FE 2.95 4.12 1.96
(0.057) (0.68) (0.63)
Panel D: Hours workedd
OLS 2.45 2.51 0.11 2.30 2.92 0.93
(0.78) (1.03) (0.82) (0.63) (0.67) (0.68)
FE 2.30 2.37 0.06
(0.58) (0.72) (0.38)
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Estimates in bold are signicant at the 5 percent level. See the notes
to Table 2 for other details, including sample sizes, unless dierently noted.
a Equals to 1 if a woman works 30 or more hours per week, and 0 otherwise.
b Equals to 1 if a woman works any positive number of hours per week, and 0 otherwise.
c Includes women with zero hours of work.
d Excludes women with zero hours of work. The number of observations is 10446 (of which, 3493 on single mothers and
6953 on single childless women) and 52,483 (of which, 17,138 on single mothers and 35,345 on single childless women) in
the BHPS and the FRS samples, respectively.
Table 4: WFTC Implementation and Announcement Eects | Eligible Employment by Age of Youngest
Child and Number of Children
BHPS FRS
(1) (2) (1) (2)
(1) (1) (0) (1) (1) (0)
OLS
One child aged 0{4 0.097 0.121 0.048 0.066 0.083 0.040
(0.021) (0.029) (0.017) (0.018) (0.030) (0.018)
One child aged 5{10 0.078 0.094 0.037 0.059 0.071 0.031
(0.023) (0.035) (0.018) (0.019) (0.030) (0.013)
One child aged 11{18 0.031 0.033 0.004 0.030 0.031 0.009
(0.026) (0.028) (0.019) (0.022) (0.024) (0.016)
Two children or more, 0.044 0.047 0.026 0.046 0.049 0.019
youngest aged 0{4 (0.032) (0.023) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.016)
Two children or more, 0.003 0.003 0.011 0.008 0.006 0.007
youngest aged 5{10 (0.028) (0.030) (0.021) (0.019) (0.025) (0.012)
Two children or more, 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.001
youngest aged 11{18 (0.031) (0.033) (0.020) (0.027) (0.030) (0.018)
FE
One child aged 0{4 0.085 0.096 0.038
(0.025) (0.026) (0.017)
One child aged 5{10 0.070 0.084 0.029
(0.031) (0.024) (0.013)
One child aged 11{18 0.032 0.028 0.011
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Two children or more, 0.038 0.043 0.016
youngest aged 0{4 (0.021) (0.020) (0.018)
Two children or more, 0.020 0.019 0.010
youngest aged 5{10 (0.024) (0.024) (0.019)
Two children or more, 0.009 0.011 {0.002
youngest aged 11{18 (0.033) (0.032) (0.025)
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Estimates in bold are signicant at the ve percent level. Denitions,
number of observations, and list of variables used in estimation are in the notes to Table 2.
Table 5: Paid Child Care Utilization, Overall and by Age of Youngest Child and Number of Children
BHPS (N = 5,616) FRS (N = 35,469)
(1) (2) (1) (2)
(1) (1) (0) (1) (1) (0)
Panel A: Paid child care utilizationa
OLS 0.031 0.031 {0.004 0.019 0.021 {0.007
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
FE 0.028 0.029 0.001
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Panel B: Paid child care utilization by child's age and number of childrena
OLS
One child aged 0{4 0.047 0.044 0.003 0.032 0.035 {0.003
(0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014)
One child aged 5{10 0.038 0.041 0.002 0.028 0.028 {0.001
(0.009) (0.016) (0.015) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006)
Two children or more, 0.013 0.011 {0.006 0.003 0.005 {0.010
youngest aged 0{4 (0.019) (0.017) (0.013) (0.006) (0.012) (0.009)
FE
One child aged 0{4 0.040 0.043 0.001
(0.014) (0.019) (0.022)
One child aged 5{10 0.031 0.030 {0.001
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Two children or more, 0.011 0.006 {0.0001
youngest aged 0{4 (0.023) (0.025) (0.009)
Panel C: Unpaid child care utilizationb
OLS 0.002 {0.001 0.029 {0.003 0.001 0.017
(0.019) (0.014) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007)
FE 0.008 0.004 0.018
(0.023) (0.026) (0.009)
Panel D: Unpaid child care utilization by child's age and number of childrenb
OLS
One child aged 0{4 0.003 0.005 0.034 0.002 0.001 0.025
(0.008) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.010)
One child aged 5{10 0.001 {0.002 0.026 {0.04 0.001 0.020
(0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.027) (0.025) (0.008)
Two children or more, {0.003 {0.004 0.008 {0.001 {0.003 {0.004
youngest aged 0{4 (0.018) (0.023) (0.022) (0.014) (0.019) (0.029)
FE
One child aged 0{4 0.009 0.009 0.023
(0.018) (0.022) (0.011)
One child aged 5{10 0.006 {0.001 0.019
(0.022) (0.024) (0.010)
Two children or more, 0.008 0.004 0.007
youngest aged 0{4 (0.025) (0.018) (0.013)
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Estimates in bold are signicant at the ve percent level. All estimates
are obtained from linear probability models on the subsamples of single mothers.
a The dependent variable takes value one if the mother works, has at least one child aged 12 or less, and pays for child care
arrangements, and zero otherwise.
b The dependent variable takes value one if the mother works, has at least one child aged 12 or less, and does not pay for
child care arrangements, and zero otherwise.
Table 6: Eligible Employment Transitions (BHPS)
(1) (2)
(1) (1) (0) N
Persistence probabilitya 0.058 0.070 0.024 6,478
(0.028) (0.033) (0.008)
Entry probabilityb 0.035 0.054 0.022 5,429
(0.015) (0.023) (0.010)
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Estimates in bold are signicant at the ve percent level. N denotes the
number of wave-on-wave state-specic transitions.
a Obtained from linear probability models of transitions in labor market states on the sample of single childless women and
lone mothers. Conditional on being in eligible employment in t 1.
b Obtained from linear probability models of transitions in labor market states on the sample of single childless women and
lone mothers. Conditional on not being in eligible employment in t 1.
Table 7: Transitions in Eligible Employment and Child Care Utilization (BHPS)
Implementation Announcement
Type of transition (1) (0) N
From nonwork to eligible employment with paid child carea 0.039 {0.001 1,871
(0.015) (0.010)
From nonwork to eligible employment without paid child carea 0.013 0.021 1,871
(0.022) (0.010)
From eligible employment without paid child care to eligible 0.047 {0.003 2,093
employment with paid child careb (0.013) (0.023)
Persistence in eligible employment without paid child careb 0.020 0.025 2,093
(0.021) (0.011)
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Estimates in bold are signicant at the ve percent level. Estimates
are obtained from linear probability models of transitions in labor market states on the subsample of lone mothers with
children aged 12 or less. N denotes the number of wave-on-wave state-specic transitions.
a The nonwork (origin) state includes women who work less than 16 hours per week and (if working) do not use paid
child care.
b Conditions on working 16 or more hours per week in both origin and destination states.
Table 8: Sensitivity Checks: Restricting the BHPS Sample to 1995{2002
Implementation Announcement
Selected labor market outcomes (1) (0) N
Eligible employment 0.038 0.012 10,224
(0.016) (0.032)
Full time employment 0.033 0.016 10,224
(0.015) (0.008)
Employment 0.042 0.008 10,224
(0.020) (0.021)
Hours worked (including zero hours) 3.58 1.88 10,224
(1.73) (0.67)
Persistence probability in eligible employment 0.055 0.016 4,340
(0.026) (0.025)
Entry probability in eligible employment 0.050 0.019 3,637
(0.029) (0.015)
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Estimates in bold are signicant at the ve percent level. Estimates
are obtained from OLS models. See Tables 2, 3 and 6 for details.
Appendix Table A1: Summary Statistics by Sample
BHPS FRS
Unmarried women Unmarried women
without children Lone mothers without children Lone mothers
Outcomes
Eligible employmenta 0.636 0.415 0.686 0.431
Employmentb 0.721 0.622 0.730 0.602
Full time employmentc 0.526 0.270 0.543 0.302
Weekly hours worked 25.6 15.1 26.2 15.4
(including zeros) (16.7) (13.2) (15.8) (12.7)
Weekly hours worked 32.7 24.1 33.0 24.5
(conditional on work)d (16.7) (13.2) (16.2) (12.9)
Transition probabilities in eligible employment:
Persistence probability 0.903 0.644
Entry probability 0.262 0.191
Paid child care utilization 0.134 0.142
Main explanatory variables
Age (years) 33.096 30.728 34.339 33.951
(13.510) (11.412) (13.340) (8.262)
Ethnic origin:
White 0.956 0.914 0.931 0.911
Black 0.022 0.038 0.032 0.050
Indian 0.007 0.022 0.010 0.008
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 0.003 0.014 0.012 0.011
Chinese or other 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.020
Education:
No qualication 0.172 0.176
Less than O level/GCSE 0.081 0.120
O level/GCSE (or equivalent) 0.213 0.343
A level (or equivalent) 0.194 0.137
Higher vocational qualication 0.192 0.168
University degree or more 0.149 0.056
Left education at age 18 0.700 0.893
Number of children by age group:
0{4 0.389 0.524
(0.512) (0.672
5{10 0.587 0.624
(0.754) (0.757)
11{18 0.771 0.598
(0.754) (0.790)
Housing tenure:
Owner 0.597 0.582 0.624 0.468
In social housing 0.185 0.345 0.163 0.431
In privately rented accommodation 0.212 0.073 0.213 0.101
Number of person-wave observations 9,644 5,616
Number of women 1,868 1,606 48,418 28,468
Sources: British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), 1991-2002; Family Resources Survey (FRS), 1995/96-2002/03.
Notes: Figures are sample means (standard deviations are shown in parentheses).
a Working 16 or more hours per week.
b Working 1 or more hours per week.
c Working 30 or more hours per week.
d Number of person-wave observations are 10,446 in the BHPS sample (6,953 for childless women and 3,493 for mothers)
and 52,483 in the FRS sample (35,345 for childless women and 17,138 for single mothers).
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Figure 1: Benchmark Model (No Saving) — Impact on Employment Rates
Note: All figures are percentages computed with respect to a baseline scenario in which there is no reform and in
which the possibility of a reform is never envisaged by women, i.e., pi1 = pi2 = 0 and no reform is introduced. Scenario
1: pi1 = pi2 = 0 and the reform is introduced in period 3, d3 = 1. Scenario 2: pi1 = 0, pi2 = 1 and the reform is
introduced in period 3, dt = 1. Scenario 3: pi1 = 0.5, pi2 = 1 and the reform is introduced in period 3, d3 = 1.
Scenario 4: pi1 = 0, pi2 = 1 and the reform is not introduced in period 3, d3 = 0. The other parameter values are:
δ = 0.95, r = 0.05, Nit = 0.5, w0 = 0.2, α = 0 (no human capital accumulation), β = 0.45, γ1 = −1.4, γ2 = 0 (utility
is time separable), γ3 = 0 and λt(0) = 1 (no job search frictions).
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Period 1
Period 2
Period 3
Figure 2: Model with Search Frictions — Impact on Employment Rates
Note: For a description see note to Figure 1. All parameter values are as in Figure 1, except λt(0) = 0.5.
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Figure 3: Model with Human Capital Formation — Impact on Employment Rates
Note: For a description see note to Figure 1. All parameter values are as in Figure 1, except α = 0.25.
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Figure 4: Model with Habit Persistence — Impact on Employment Rates
Note: For a description see note to Figure 1. All parameter values are as in Figure 1, except γ2 = 0.25.
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Figure 5: Model with Intertemporal Substitution — Impact on Employment Rates
Note: For a description see note to Figure 1. All parameter values are as in Figure 1, except γ2 = −2.5.
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Figure 6: Model with Saving — Impact on Employment Rates
Note: For a description see note to Figure 1.
025
50
75
100
In
-
w
or
k 
be
n
e
fit
 
(£/
w
e
ek
)
0 10 20 30 40 5016
Hours per week
FC WFTC
WFTC (childcare benefit as under FC)
With childcare benefit
(a) FC and WFTC schedules, weekly awards
50
150
250
D
isp
os
a
bl
e 
in
co
m
e
 
(£/
w
ee
k)
0 10 20 30 40 5016
Hours per week
FC WFTC
WFTC (childcare benefit as under FC)
With childcare benefit
(b) Budget constraints under FC and WFTC
Figure 7: FC and WFTC Schedules and Budget Constraints
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Figure 8: Trends in Eligible Employment
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Figure 9: Employment Rates and Entry into New Jobs Around the Announcement
Date
